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10 Definitions
Termination11 An organization is considered
12 terminated if it is fully abolished,
13 merged with another organization,
14 or split into different autonomous
15 new entities.
Transition16 An organization experiences a
17 transition if it is either terminated,
18 absorbed by another organization,
19 or succeeded by another
20 organization with a new name, at a
21 new level of operation, or with
22 other new structural
23 characteristics.
24Introduction
25Do bureaucracies become immortal beyond the
26control of elected politicians, as popular wisdom
27(or fear) often suggests? Since Herbert Kaufman
28(1976) started to investigate this very question, a
29new strand of research has emerged to study the
30demography of public organizations, somewhat in
31line with population ecology approaches in the
32business literature. Scholars on both sides of the
33Atlantic studied the transformation of government
34by looking at the creation and termination of
35public organizations.
36The studies on survival of public organizations
37agree on one aspect. Public organizations are far
38from perennial. Scholars arrive at the same con-
39clusion regarding a diversity of public sector
40populations: over time, most public organizations
41perish. Their explanations vary, ranging from fac-
42tors such as limited public resources, elections and
43turnovers, liabilities of newness, adolescence and
44obsolescence, and the institutional “hardwiring”
45of individual public organizations.
46Studies on the demography of public organiza-
47tions seldomly build on each other, as is custom-
48ary for business administration studies in the
49population ecology realm. In particular, disagree-
50ment over deﬁnitions of organizational termina-
51tion continues to divide the debate on
52organizational survival in the public sector. As if
53during an autopsy, different doctors arrive at dif-
54ferent conclusions on the cause of death whereas a
55third one claims the patient has not died at all.
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56 The following sections provide an overview of
57 current insights, including the disagreements, on
58 public organization survival. Two strands of
59 research emerge: (1) institutionalist theories with
60 a more “dichotomous” deﬁnition of termination
61 and (2) those using public choice-oriented theo-
62 ries that consider a ﬁne-grained range of political
63 interventions on public organizations.
64 Politics and Legacies
65 Two Perspectives on Termination
66 What constitutes survival and termination of pub-
67 lic organizations, really? In the ﬁeld of business
68 administration there seems to be little discussion
69 on what is survival and what is not. Simply put, an
70 organization is either in business or it is not. This
71 lack of ambiguity in business literature allows for
72 a dichotomous deﬁnition and “biological” meta-
73 phor in studying the mortality of government
74 organizations, referring to the “mortality,” i.e.,
75 “life” and “death,” of organizations. The “popu-
76 lation ecology” approach even sees competing
77 organizations in a given area as a “species” that
78 can be studied to explain ﬁrm mortality and orga-
79 nizational founding, as well as population growth
80 and change. Ever since Kaufman (1976) adopted
81 the biological metaphor 40 years ago this ecology
82 idea has been applied increasingly on populations
83 of public sector organizations as well.
84 Yet studying termination of public organiza-
85 tions deﬁes such a strict, dichotomous deﬁnition
86 of what constitutes survival. Being “dead” or
87 “alive” in bureaucracy is not a dichotomy. Policies
88 carried out by public organizations do not often
89 come to a deﬁnite end. In fact, bureaucratic orga-
90 nizations and the policies they implement seem to
91 undergo constant structural reform. This reform
92 drive blurs the distinction between termination or
93 continuation in a dressed up (or down) version.
94 The reorganizing capacity of political execu-
95 tives is what makes public administration and
96 business administration such different ﬁelds. Pub-
97 lic organizations do not only perish because other
98 organizations outrivaled them in securing essen-
99 tial resources. Political executives can deliber-
100 ately axe public agencies or deny them funding
101for ideological or electoral reasons. This differ-
102ence matters for both termination deﬁnitions and
103their implications. In the study of the survival of
104public organizations, different perspectives on
105politics and administration have led to a consid-
106erable fragmentation of insights.
107The Political Control Approach
108The political control perspective implies that
109structural changes to public organizations are
110ﬁrst and foremost political acts. The observer –
111from a political science background presumably –
112has an interest in studying political control over
113the structure of government, from the perspective
114of the principal. Each political act deserves similar
115attention, ranging from subtle name changes of
116organizations to fully ﬂedged abolitions. From
117this perspective, biological metaphors and dichot-
118omous deﬁnitions make no sense.
119The political control approach tends to deﬁne
120most political interventions to public organiza-
121tions as termination and (re-)creation. These
122changes not only reﬂect what happens to the pub-
123lic sector, above all they constitute important
124political acts representing political control over
125the public sector. It is important that no changes
126go by unnoticed because ignoring name changes
127and other events such as change of superior orga-
128nization may mask important discontinuities. The
129subtle variety includes different “termination
130types,” such as termination by change of name,
131form, level, or acquisition of activity.
132In this perspective, even the least pervasive
133event (name change) reﬂects a signiﬁcant act of
134political control over a public organization. For
135instance, the Dutch government decided to name
136the Air Trafﬁc Security the Air Trafﬁc Control
137Netherlands from 1998 onwards. “This name
138change signals an outward and transboundary
139approach to air trafﬁc control. ATC has long
140been a domestic issue, but increasingly became a
141joint European and global responsibility – an evo-
142lution reﬂected in its name change. Though the
143agency continues as an organization this event can
144be interpreted as a termination of its previous
145form, and a start of a ‘new’ phase in a new
146form” (Kuipers et al. 2017). Seemingly small
147changes still represent a discontinuation of “key
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148 structural features.” The political control perspec-
149 tive identiﬁes such a discontinuation or structural
150 change as an “event,” implying some form of
151 termination.
152 The Institutional Legacy Approach
153 The contrasting approach implies that changes in
154 the structure of government are the consequence
155 of the fact that public organizations have their
156 own interests (probably continuation). The public
157 organization adapts to its environment and sees
158 political interventions as a necessary evil that
159 becomes part of the legacy to be carried into its
160 future. The organizations themselves take center
161 stage and their study – from a public administra-
162 tion or sociological institutional background –
163 focuses on what organizations do to strike root,
164 survive, and prosper. Biographical accounts of the
165 rise and demise of particular organizations go
166 hand in hand with life and death metaphors.
167 The institutional legacy approach would there-
168 fore advocate a more dichotomous deﬁnition of
169 termination instead of the subtle variety discerned
170 by the political control approach. Organizations
171 only perish when they cease to exist in any form.
172 All other events in the life of a public organization
173 are forms of adaptation, perhaps even on its own
174 initiative, in its struggle to survive. For instance,
175 the Tennessee Valley Authority rose from an orga-
176 nization created to protect the region against
177 ﬂooding and soil erosion while at the same time
178 exploit hydroelectric power to a nuclear power
179 house 50 years down the road. The New York
180 Port Authority born out of an interstate conﬂict
181 about railroad freight rates was a seriously
182 underfunded attempt to increase economic coop-
183 eration on both sides of the Hudson River. It
184 turned into an engineering and transportation
185 powerhouse, responsible for harbor and airport
186 development, bus and truck terminals, in addition
187 to building bridges and tunnels. Institutionalists
188 focus on how public organizations form their mis-
189 sion from the moment of their inception and how
190 the legacy that the organization built over time
191 becomes the seeds of its eventual demise. The
192 political control approach above would instead
193 dissect the life of the TVA or the Port Authority
194 in different durations for “different”
195organizations, whereas students of institutional
196legacy emphasize the integrity of the institution,
197adapting over time.
198Different Perspectives Relate to Different Research
199Designs and Methods
200Institutional legacy arguments require compara-
201tive case studies instead of large N studies on
202populations. Case studies allow for a deﬁnition
203of termination that depends largely on the judg-
204ment of and substantiation by the researcher. The
205researcher builds an argument and in turn pro-
206vides the reader with ample substance on each
207case heuristically to validate the argumentation.
208Yet even some large N studies take the organiza-
209tion and its institutional legacy as vantage point.
210They discern “maintenance,” “succession,” or
211organizational change categories as a
212go-between life and death. These studies use com-
213parable deﬁnitions, but they do not explain events.
214Their distinction between terminating events and
215maintenance events does, in spite of their large
216number of observations, not allow for regression
217analysis and event history modeling to generate
218statistically robust explanations.
219The political control studies employ large
220N statistical regressions. In order to ﬁnd out
221which political factors inﬂuence survival, authors
222employ event-history analysis to explain “termi-
223nation” events. The method does not tolerate cat-
224egories between life and death, so most changes in
225the organizational structure are considered a ter-
226mination event. Yet even studies that do statisti-
227cally investigate the factors that affect survival use
228different deﬁnitions such that their ﬁndings have a
229different base, and as such they do not add up in a
230meta-analysis.
231The more studies focus on organizational char-
232acteristics as a theoretical explanation for sur-
233vival, the more they tend to use dichotomous
234termination deﬁnitions that imply stability.
235Those studies that see political control as the
236main survival explanation focus on events indi-
237cating organizational discontinuity. The next sec-
238tion presents an overview of the most important
239factors and ﬁndings from current studies to con-
240struct a model of organizational survival.
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241 Organizational Survival in the Public
242 Sector: Towards a Model
243 In spite of their disagreement on deﬁnitions of
244 organizational termination, this section compares
245 the results of existing studies on survival of public
246 organizations. The result is a theoretical model of
247 determinants of organizational survival and over-
248 view of common ﬁndings and disagreements in
249 existing research. This section ﬁrst introduces the
250 hypotheses and ends with a summary of ﬁndings.
251 Three categories of factors seem to matter in
252 the literature on survival of public organizations:
253 (1) demographic explanations centering around
254 the age of the organization, (2) design explana-
255 tions implying that “birth characteristics” of orga-
256 nizations will inﬂuence future survival chances,
257 and (3) contextual or functional explanations that
258 reveal why some public organizations survive
259 changes in their environment as opposed to
260 others.
261 The perhaps most prominent and oldest factor
262 of interest to students of organizational survival is
263 the age of the organization. Common wisdom
264 holds that organizations tend to survive inﬁnitely
265 after they reached maturity. Empirical studies
266 demonstrated that an organization’s survival
267 chances do not monotonically increase with age,
268 however. New organizations are particularly vul-
269 nerable because they have not been able to nest
270 themselves and their routines sufﬁciently in their
271 environment. In their early years, political volatil-
272 ity or growing pains may be fatal to the budding
273 organization. Also, particular vulnerabilities can
274 arise for the riper organization: obsolescence
275 becomes a threat when an organization’s function-
276 ality cannot keep up with changes in their envi-
277 ronment (think of a steamboat inspection service,
278 or a ﬁrm such as Kodak) or when their mission has
279 been accomplished (ﬁghting polio). If organiza-
280 tions’ hazards increase both when they are very
281 young and very mature, the survival chances of an
282 organization would resemble an inverted U-curve.
283 In between, the hazards of the juvenile organi-
284 zation may increase. In its infant years, when its
285 legislative support base has just been established
286 and its proponents are still in ofﬁce, the organiza-
287 tion can develop relatively unharmed. More than a
288decade down the road, the organization has sufﬁ-
289ciently secured its resources and support base to
290fend of competitors and opponents. However, in
291the in-between period, the organization’s hazards
292rise because the protective shield of its creators
293may have diminished, and it becomes vulnerable
294to termination efforts by its opponents. Also, dur-
295ing the organization’s adolescence, legislative
296actors have had time to learn about the organiza-
297tion and its accomplishments or performance
298(Carpenter and Lewis 2004). This learning may
299result in the increased likelihood of fatal critique
300and termination. Each age effect results in a dif-
301ferent hypothesis AU2related to survival.
302H1. A public organization is less likely to survive
303in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after creation (liability
304of newness). After ﬁve years the termination
305chances of public organizations decrease.
306H2. Public organizations are more likely to be
307terminated in their ‘adolescent’ years
308(>5 < 10).
309H3. A public organization is likely to become
310obsolete at some point and thus faces
311increased hazards when it has reached a
312mature age (>30).
313Second, organizational survival in the public
314sector can be explained by looking at the agen-
315cies’ “birth characteristics” or “DNA.” Some
316organizations simply have a stronger design,
317they are “hardwired” for survival. Hardwiring
318theory especially dominates in political science,
319where organizations are seen as embodiments of
320political interests. Political science intrinsically
321links the acts of organizational change to
322legislative-executive decision-making. Instead of
323the invisible hand that weeds out some organiza-
324tions in a population, public sector organizations
325sometimes face very visible opponents. Politically
326informed “attacks” on bureaucracy are predict-
327able, so creators try to “hardwire” their organiza-
328tional offspring into survival. The effects of
329institutional design result in the following
330hypotheses:
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331 H4. Organizations established by formal law
332 have higher chances of survival than organi-
333 zations established by decree.
334 H5. Organizations set up at arm’s length of gov-
335 ernment have higher chances of survival
336 than organizations that operate in the hier-
337 archy of a ministerial department or execu-
338 tive ofﬁce.
339 Another product of intentional hard wiring is
340 the organization’s internal structure. Organiza-
341 tions’ structural traits such as whether they are
342 governed by a board or not (single administrators)
343 could also have an impact on survival.
344 H6. Organizations governed by a board are more
345 likely to survive than organizations governed
346 by a single administrator.
347 An increasing number of termination studies
348 have included the organizational “type” (advisory,
349 regulatory, executive) as a factor of inﬂuence.
350 Two types that stand out in the literature
351 (advisory and regulatory versus the rest) are both
352 included here. The distinct hypotheses reﬂect that
353 the assumed inﬂuence on survival differs.
354 H7. Advisory organizations have less likely to
355 survive than other types of public
356 organizations.
357 H8. Regulatory organizations have higher
358 chances of survival than other types of public
359 organizations.
360 Some organizations are intended to be termi-
361 nated from the start. Their “sunset clause” spec-
362 iﬁes when, or under what conditions, the
363 organization will be abolished.
364 H9. When organizations are created with a sun-
365 set clause, they are unlikely to survive that
366 clause and mature into ‘old age’ (>average).
367 Third, termination studies on public organiza-
368 tions usually control for political and economic
369 indicators. The general expectation is that turn-
370 over is likely to affect survival of organizations in
371 a negative way because incoming elects will
372probably attack the creations of their predeces-
373sors. In addition, a rightwing government will
374probably aim to downsize the public sector. Eco-
375nomic indicators also serve as an important con-
376trol: when government revenues go down, it
377seems less inclined to spend resources on uphold-
378ing public organizations. The opposite effect may
379also hold: recession makes incumbents unwilling
380to dismantle government organizations unlikely
381because in the short run this will increase
382unemployment.
383H10. Political turnover negatively affects sur-
384vival of public organizations.
385H11. A right wing (majority in) government neg-
386atively affects survival of public
387organizations.
388H12. Incumbency of a political executive of
389another political color than the organiza-
390tion’s creator (so-called ‘unfriendly govern-
391ment’) negatively affects survival of public
392organizations.
393H13. When total government revenues decrease,
394the likelihood of survival of public organi-
395zations decreases as well.
396The next section provides an overview and
397discussion of the actual impact of these factors
398on organizational survival according to a set of
399recent studies.
400Comparative Findings
401Section three has not yet revealed how these fac-
402tors fared in empirical analyses on the public
403sector. The table below presents the ﬁndings
404from the studies reviewed for each of the hypoth-
405eses above. Positive relation to survival is indi-
406cated by a “+” and a negative effect on survival by
407a “.” So a “+” for newness does not mean that
408the liability of newness is conﬁrmed, but that
409newness has a positive effect on survival.
410A tested but inconsequential factor is indicated
411by an “x” and the “U” stands for nonlinear effects
412(for instance, insulation from presidential interfer-
413ence is a liability in the ﬁrst 6 years of an
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414 organization’s lifespan but protects it in the long
415 run; see Boin et al. 2010) (Table 1).
416 According to this overview, on average 54% of
417 the cases perish during the period studied, about
418 1.5% of the studied population annually. This
419 result ofﬁcially debunks the myth of immortality.
420 The varying time periods of the studies require us
421 to temporalize the results. The comparably high
422 percentages of 52% (Boin et al. 2016) and 58%
423 (Greasley and Hanretty 2014) become very differ-
424 ent termination rates when divided by the number
425 of years of the studied period.
426 Nine factors seem to have a signiﬁcant unidi-
427 rectional effect on survival. Old age increases
428 survival chances (H3), and so does a regulatory
429 function (H8), and a ﬁrm legislative base (H4).
430 Adolescence (H2) is a hazard, but different expla-
431 nations rival for this effect. Advisory organiza-
432 tions (H7) are more likely to be terminated and,
433 not surprisingly, this also goes for organizations
434 set up with a sunset clause (H9). Political turnover
435 most likely negatively impacts the survival of
436 public organizations, because new political exec-
437 utives tend to reorganize the administration
438 (H10). Unfriendly incumbencies (i.e., political
439 executives of a different political ideology –
440 H12) are likely to terminate the administrative
441 agencies their political opponents previously cre-
442 ated. Rightwing incumbencies (H11) often have
443 negative effect on survival.
444 The incumbent government’s ideology can
445 also interact with other factors. Götz et al. (2015)
446 point out that leftwing incumbents tend to be less
447 likely to terminate administrative organizations,
448 unless pressure for budgetary austerity increases
449 (factors 11 and 13). Likewise, Greasley and
450 Hanretty (2014) conclude that public organiza-
451 tions’ termination hazards increase under
452 rightwing governments in “normal” times (low
453 to moderately high budget pressure). When public
454 debt increases, organizations face higher termina-
455 tion risks under leftwing rule. Greasley and
456 Hanretty additionally argue: “the effect of greater-
457 than-average debt on agency termination is nega-
458 tive for very young agencies, and for older agen-
459 cies, but positive for agencies in their third to
460 seventh years” (p. 17). So leftwing incumbencies
461 under economic strain are most likely to target
462adolescent agencies for termination (which ﬁts
463with our hypothesis 2).
464Surprisingly, the effects of economic down-
465turns also point in other directions. Carpenter
466and Lewis (2004) challenge conventional wisdom
467with their ﬁnding that budgetary pressure
468decreases survival chances for public organiza-
469tions (H13). In fact, their budgetary surpluses
470increase the hazards, and deﬁcits make termina-
471tions less likely. The short-term cost of organiza-
472tional termination would make such decisions
473unfavorable in times of austerity (Carpenter and
474Lewis 2004, p. 222). By contrast, James et al.
475(2015) found that budgetary pressure increases
476termination hazards whereas Park (2013) and
477Boin et al. (2016) tested the same factor but
478found no signiﬁcant effects.
479Insulation from executive interference (arm’s
480length status – H5) can make organizations more
481likely to survive than those created in proximity to
482the President, but not all studies agree (Lewis
4832004 vs. Boin et al. 2010). Disagreement also
484exists regarding newness (H1): being green can
485both help the organization to survive and prove to
486be a liability (see Table 1).
487Conclusion and Future Research
488Explanations for the survival of public organiza-
489tions abound. This chapter offered an assessment
490of each potential factor by comparing different
491research ﬁndings. The factors that were conﬁrmed
492in several studies could together form an inte-
493grated model of organizational survival in the
494public sector. Such an integrated model would
495predict that regulatory tasks, creation by law, and
496being older than 12 years makes organizations
497most likely to survive, but by no means hazard-
498free. In any case, hazards for public organizations
499increase when political winds change and new
500incumbents enter ofﬁce. Rightwing executives
501may be more likely to terminate public organiza-
502tions in normal times but beware of the leftwing
503executives under budgetary constraints. Such an
504integrated model could best be tested on large
505N datasets by using event-history analysis.
506Revealing underlying mechanisms, discovering
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507 new variables, and explaining outliers would ben-
508 eﬁt from a case-oriented study, as advocated
509 within the institutional legacy approach.
510 To enrich future discussions on organizational
511 survival and transformation of the public sector, it
512 seems imperative to abandon the binary deﬁnition
513 of organizational termination. Instead, a focus on
514 “transitions” would help to build on the diversity
515 of existing research and allow for more analytical
516 leverage. The word “termination” implies a deﬁ-
517 nite “end” of a period in which an organization
518 took on a particular form. Meanwhile the organi-
519 zation itself did not end. The preferred, more
520 neutral term “transitions” refers to beginnings
521 and ends of phases through which organizations
522 evolve. Such transitions are both dependent vari-
523 ables in their own right and explanatory factors for
524 survival – a great number of sudden transitions
525 could be a prelude to full termination, or the total
526 absence of transitions could indicate an ultimately
527 fatal condition of rigidity. A sequence of transi-
528 tions could reﬂect a pattern of staged adaptation to
529 changing resource levels (Levine et al. 1981). The
530 total sum of transitions of individual organiza-
531 tional units reﬂects a transformation of
532 government.
533 Transitions pertain to all the structural changes
534 to the organization that can be measured consis-
535 tently and reliably over time, such as changes to
536 the organization’s name, superior organization,
537 hierarchical level, status as staff or line unit, struc-
538 tural autonomy by law, as well as mergers, splits,
539 and abolishments. This approach allows building
540 both on existing datasets for event-history analy-
541 sis and on studies that use a dichotomous deﬁni-
542 tion of survival. Coding all detailed changes as
543 events allows for multivariate regression analyses
544 and statistical explanations on survival in the pub-
545 lic sector. The compatibility to institutional legacy
546 studies is enabled by the possibility to discard
547 more subtle transitions such as name changes in
548 the dataset in order to study long institutional
549 durations only interrupted by more deﬁnite pass-
550 ings such as mergers or splits.
551 Important steps have been made in studying
552 the transformations of public organizations indi-
553 vidually and the state in total, since Kaufman
554 started his study on organizational mortality in
5551976. However, today many studies on survival
556in the public sector focus only on independent
557agencies, in majoritarian political systems
558(cf. Park 2013; Greasly and Hanretty 2014;
559James et al. 2015; Bertelli and Sinclair 2016;
560Boin et al. 2016). Rich harvest is waiting in a
561demographic study of both autonomous agencies
562and bureaus within national ministries in conti-
563nental Europe. Such populations would allow for
564systemic comparisons on the vulnerability of
565autonomous versus embedded public organiza-
566tions and the effects of institutional design
567between majoritarian and consensual systems.
568Additionally, policy preferences in coalition gov-
569ernments probably affect administrative reform
570and organizational termination in a different way
571than in single party governments. Building on
572ﬁndings of Götz et al. (2015) and Greasley and
573Hanretty (2014), future studies could probe into
574the effects of political ideology under different
575circumstances or for different organizations.
576There is much to gain from a study on the relation
577between policy agendas (the Comparative
578Agendas project), policy preferences (the Mani-
579festos data on electoral programs), and the struc-
580ture of government in different policy areas.
581Empirical research has now established that
582public organizations do perish and that organiza-
583tional design can serve as a shield against termi-
584nation hazards. Future studies need to probe
585deeper into how speciﬁc political power plays
586and particular policy preferences impact the struc-
587ture of government.
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